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German Climate Politics:  
The Motor Sputters
Pretense and Reality
Where were the Federal Chancellor and her Foreign 
Minister when, on 22 September 2009, the Secretary-
General of  the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, gath-
ered with more than a hundred heads of  state and 
government in New York for an extraordinary Climate 
Summit? Furthermore, where was Germany’s chief  
diplomat when the Foreign Ministers of  Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Finland and Spain 
had previously campaigned in an open letter for an 
“ambitious agreement” in Copenhagen in December 
2009? Sure, schedules were tight around the time lead-
ing up to the federal elections of  the 27th of  Septem-
ber. Yet a leading role in international climate politics, 
which the Federal Government was able to adorn 
itself  with just some years ago, looks quite differently.
After the EU enlargement rounds in 2004/2007, it 
seemed as if  German foreign policy had already found 
its next major project: The Federal Government had 
declared the fight against climate change as its prior-
ity for the presidencies of  the EU and the G8. Credit 
must also be given to Federal Chancellor Angela 
Merkel for convincing President George W. Bush 
at the G8 summit 2007 in Heiligendamm to at least 
“consider seriously” the reduction of  greenhouse gas 
emissions. Thus, the Federal Government had taken a 
leading role, which bestowed international respect and 
influence upon German foreign policy. At the same 
time, the German economy was well positioned in the 
renewable energy and efficiency technology sectors, 
inter alia, due to necessary state support.
But then the financial and economic crises hit. Climate 
policy rapidly lost importance within the Federal Gov-
ernment. At the end of  2008, for instance, Ms. Merkel 
lobbied vehemently for weak CO2-benchmarks for 
cars in the EU. This resulted in German and European 
car manufacturers not having to increase efficiency 
all that significantly. A year before, the Government 
had taken up the original proposal of  the European 
Commission in the Meseberg climate package, which 
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envisaged stricter emission benchmarks and time 
limits. But apparently, Angela Merkel fell back into 
the antiquated thinking of  climate protection versus 
jobs. Thus, in December 2008, she told the press that 
the upcoming EU summit “must not make decisions 
that would endanger jobs or investments in Germany. 
I will make sure of  that.” And indeed, it was mainly 
Germany that, together with some Central European 
countries, sought to weaken the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme. Even Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, 
the Chancellor’s advisor on climate issues, had warned 
against Germany losing its credibility at that time.
Other Countries Take the Lead
While some countries reduced their climate protection 
efforts during the economic crisis, others regarded a 
“Green New Deal” as a better solution to the crisis. For 
instance, at the turn of  the year 2008/2009, China ap-
proved an economic stimulus package with 38 percent 
of  the investments scheduled for “green” programs. 
In South Korea, this figure was at 80 percent. In 
Germany, however, “green” investments accounted 
for only 13 percent of  the stimulus packages 1 and 2. 
Germany, persisting in old reflexes, became a dubi-
ous example for other countries with some eventually 
copying the ad-hoc subsidies measure for endangered 
but outdated automotive production chains. At the 
same time, German renewable energy companies were 
whip-sawed by increasing competition from East Asia 
and the U.S.
These developments did not only weaken the EU’s in-
ternal climate negotiations, they also endanger the UN 
climate negotiations. It had mainly been the European 
Union—often with Germany as the driving force—
that had advanced the international climate negotia-
tions as pacemaker. Many observers had already hoped 
for the EU’s successful and one-voice foreign climate 
policy to become a model for the whole EU foreign 
policy. In the meantime, however, it has become other 
countries that set the pace of  negotiations, including 
Mexico, South Africa, Switzerland, and Norway. Japan, 
with significantly increased emission reduction targets 
after the August 2009 change of  government, has 
brought itself  into position for a leading role in inter-
national climate politics as well.
And Germany? If  German foreign policy makers are 
serious about their aspirations to set an exemplary cli-
mate policy and assume an internationally leading role, 
the new Federal Government has to put in some effort. 
Five tasks are crucial.
1) Rebuilding Credibility through Consistency 
and Commitment
Those who take the lead in an international movement 
but paddle backward at the first sign of  headwind 
loose credibility. Other countries, such as South Korea 
and China, have proven through their future-oriented 
“green” stimulus packages that it is possible to regard 
the economic crisis as a chance and to use that wind 
by setting the sails right (keyword “beyond recovery”). 
The loss in credibility is not restrained to climate 
policy; it affects the whole of  German foreign policy. 
How can Germany’s partners have confidence in Ger-
man foreign policy, when Berlin proves to be fickle 
with regard to a subject it has loudly proclaimed to be 
of  special interest to its people? If  the Federal Gov-
ernment decides that Germany should take the lead in 
international climate politics, it has to follow through 
and remain credible in its engagement.
This accounts for international climate financing 
as well. Without the highly industrialized countries’ 
far-reaching financing of  adaptation and mitigation 
measures in the countries of  the global South, China 
or India will not substantially contribute to climate 
protection. Since the U.S. is still dropping out, the EU 
cannot just sit back. Germany, however, has deceler-
ated. But an early and ambitious financing offer by the 
EU is essential. This is due to the fact that it is only 
then that decision makers in countries like India can be 
convinced in their internal decision making processes 
to contribute themselves to far-ranging emissions 
reductions. Furthermore, such capital transfers are a 
double investment: into a future with less expenditure 
on climate change induced damages, as well as into 
an increased demand for German climate protection 
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technology. A leading role in climate financing does 
not only raise Germany’s credibility; it pays off.
2) Establishing Domestic Climate Policy 
through Energy Policy
German climate policy can only become a credible in-
ternational model, as long as it is built upon an exem-
plary domestic climate policy. In this regard, domestic 
climate policy is first and foremost energy policy. Ger-
man energy policy needs to develop renewable energy 
sources consistently, further enhance energy efficiency 
as well as realize unused energy saving potentials. 
Fossil fuels will become significantly more expensive 
in the coming years, due to the worldwide reduction 
of  cheaply developable producing areas, the increas-
ing global energy demand, and the pricing-in of  costs 
of  climate change through emissions trading, carbon 
taxes, or other mechanisms. This also applies to coal, 
which is especially detrimental to the climate. Oil and 
gas import dependency from the politically unstable 
Middle East, as well as from Russia and the Caspian 
region, has risen as well. In addition, the EU has to 
increasingly compete with China, India, and other 
emerging economies for these imports, thus increasing 
the probability of  conflicts. Against the background of  
these trends, only those who restructure their energy 
supply timely and sustainably will gain competitive 
advantages. It is clear that foreign climate policy, no 
matter how committed it may be, will remain ineffec-
tive without an exemplary domestic climate policy.
3) Putting forth Foreign Climate Policy that Will 
Enhance Foreign Trade Policy
In 2009, Germany was decisively involved in the cre-
ation of  two seminal initiatives in international energy 
and climate politics: the International Renewable En-
ergy Agency (IRENA), and the Russian-German En-
ergy Agency (RuDEA). Both organizations now face a 
practical test, and it is especially important, in regard to 
IRENA, that Germany’s support for the new organiza-
tion does not fade—even though headquarters will be 
set up in Abu Dhabi and not in Bonn as was hoped 
before. One reason is that through the global develop-
ment of  renewable energy and efficiency technologies, 
the German economy can develop new markets. But 
to keep their status as that of  technological forerun-
ners, German companies also need political support, 
such as the export initiatives for renewable energy and 
efficiency technologies that were set up by the Federal 
Ministry of  Economics in 2002 and 2007. The renew-
able energy sector alone already employs more than 
a quarter million people in Germany. In this sense, 
foreign climate policy means job policy and foreign 
trade policy, as well as actively contributing to climate 
protection. The new government as well has to consis-
tently enhance and develop this approach.
4) Developing CCS-Technology for Export
In this context, greater efforts have to be made with 
regard to research and development of  CCS (Carbon 
Capture and Storage), i. e. the technology that seques-
ters the CO2 set free through the combustion of  fossil 
fuels and stores it underground. Climate scientists 
stress that CCS-technology will have to be used on a 
large scale in order to extract CO2 out of  the atmo-
sphere. Even if  CCS fails to be applied ubiquitously 
in Germany due to acceptability problems, this must 
not endanger introducing pilot projects in Germany 
and the bringing of  technology into the market. This 
is because the main area for CCS remains in countries 
that continue to set up their coal-fired power plants, 
which are especially harmful to the climate. This refers 
particularly to China and the U.S., which together 
account for about 60 percent of  global coal consump-
tion. Especially in China, which disposes of  one-third 
of  the world’s coal reserves, coal is to be expected 
to remain the most important energy source for the 
decades to come, despite the fact that the country also 
invests heavily in renewable energy. A reduction of  
China’s CO2 emissions will not be reached through 
moral appellations in international climate negotiations, 
but through the necessary technology at hand. There-
fore, it is most likely that CCS will be a growth market 
in China and elsewhere, and it would be negligent to 
leave that market to others.
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5) Integrating Russia More thoroughly into 
Climate Negotiations
Before and during the climate negotiations in Copen-
hagen in December 2009, the Swedish EU Presidency 
will also be negotiating in the name of  Germany. How-
ever, this does not free Germany of  its responsibility 
and role as the motor of  the EU. Its additional task is 
to more thoroughly integrate Russia, which has so far 
been neglected, into the climate negotiations through 
an intensive and equitable dialogue, and to motivate 
it towards a constructive and far-ranging contribution. 
The West, especially the U.S., is involved in moving 
China and other emerging economies towards commit-
ments. This is, without a doubt, extremely important, 
but it could backfire in Copenhagen if  Russia was to 
be “forgotten” in the run-up and frustrated an ambi-
tious agreement the last minute.
Although being a latecomer, Russia has already played 
a responsible role in the climate negotiations with its 
decisive ratification of  the Kyoto protocol in 2004. In 
the past months, the Russian leaders have also seem-
ingly changed their minds in a positive direction, re-
garding climate change. They have increasingly realized 
that Russia’s role cannot be that of  a mainly destruc-
tive one in international climate protection, if  it is to 
remain influential in other international questions as 
well. However, old fears that committing to emission 
reductions would restrict its economic development 
have prevailed. Therefore, it is especially important to 
integrate Russia more thoroughly into the negotiations 
that are taking place currently. With its climate diplo-
macy, Finland is active towards its big neighbor, but is 
far from having the political weight of  Germany. In-
deed, Germany is especially qualified to approach this 
task through its multi-faceted and trustworthy relation-
ship with its Russian partners. In addition, European 
experts and governments seem to feel that Germany 
must manage the integration of  Russia. “Who else?”, 
they ask, shrugging.
Germany as Climate Forerunner and Leader!
The transition to a sustainable, emission-neutral 
economy and society has become the global task of  
the century, the next years being those that are most 
crucial. Consensus largely prevails in climate science 
that global greenhouse gas emissions will have to peak 
no later than 2017 and decrease rapidly, if  the worst is 
to be avoided. Germany finds itself  in a key role. But 
at the moment, Berlin does not seem to be too keen 
assuming that role. Together with the EU, Germany 
could take the lead in the global climate project, gain-
ing—besides markets—sympathy and reputation. The 
negative example of  the U.S. under President Bush 
impressively demonstrated just how important “soft 
power” is for a country’s international influence.
If  the new Federal Government takes up the above-
elaborated tasks consistently, then climate policy can 
become the next major project of  Germany’s foreign 
policy, following European unification. As a climate 
forerunner that shows the path to decarbonization and 
as a climate leader that convinces other countries to 
follow that path, Germany provides a positive example 
to the international community. It can, therefore, also 
lend more importance to foreign policy initiatives in 
other sectors. Thus, a committed climate policy by the 
new Federal Government would strengthen Germany 
and the EU as global actors.
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